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In February 2008, five patients were infected with the H1N1 subtype of influenza A virus in one 
hospital ward for immunocompromised patients at a hospital in North Rhine-Westphalia, Germany. All 
of these patients had an established haematologic disease and tested positive either for viral RNA or 
antigen shortly after the beginning of respiratory illness. In three of the patients, influenza virus was 
repeatedly detected, and four of the patients died in coincidence with the virus infection. Sequencing 
of the amplified (HA1) haemagglutinin yielded identical nucleotide sequences in isolates from three of 
the patients, whereas one nucleotide difference was found in the isolate of the fourth patient, resulting 
in an amino acid substitution (G153R). To investigate the source of infection, the medical staff (n = 
104) of the hospital unit was tested and found negative for influenza virus RNA and antigen in 
pharyngeal lavages. Testing for influenza virus antibodies by immunofluorescence assay revealed that 
12 staff members were positive for influenza virus A IgA antibodies. These findings suggest that wild-
type influenza virus infections occurred within the medical staff at the same time the patients were 





Seasonal influenza is one of the major burdens on public health and is associated with 250,000–
500,000 deaths worldwide every year [10]. It is well known that especially the elderly, neonates and 
patients with underlying chronic diseases are at risk for influenza-associated morbidity and mortality 
[2, 4]. Several outbreaks of nosocomial influenza have been described in recent years [7, 9, 12]. In 
these cases, unvaccinated health care workers (HCWs) have been identified as the main source of 
infection [11]. Annual vaccination against influenza is recommended by almost all national public-
health authorities. Nevertheless, the vaccination coverage of HCWs is usually under 40% worldwide 
[1, 15]. In February 2008, five patients in one hospital ward for immunocompromised patients 
displayed a sudden onset of respiratory disease. The detection of influenza virus in three of the 
patients within 4 days alerted the Institute of Virology of the University Hospital of Essen to initiate 
diagnostic surveillance of the patients in this hospital and to introduce control measures. This report 
summarizes the findings from the investigation, which suggest that the H1N1 subtype of the influenza 
A virus was circulating in the hospital ward. Furthermore, our findings indicate that the unvaccinated 
medical staff might have contributed to the spread of virus between patients.  
 
 




In this investigation, a case of influenza disease was identified if the virus was detected from a 
respiratory specimen, either by RT-PCR or antigen detection. Individuals were not included if they only 
presented clinical symptoms of respiratory disease. Antibody responses to influenza virus were not 
included in the case definition of patients because commercially available assays are not sufficiently 
reliable, especially in a cohort of leukaemic patients with underlying immunodeficiency. 
 
 
Detection of influenza viruses 
 
Nasopharyngeal swabs (NP), bronchoalveolar lavages (BAL) or pharyngeal lavages (PL) of patients 
were tested for viral RNA and influenza virus antigen. For RT-PCR, the viral RNA was extracted from 
samples (MagNA Pure LC Total Nucleic Acid Isolation Kit, Roche) and assayed by real-time PCR 
(artus® Influenza LC RT-PCR Kit, Roche) using a LightCycler® Instrument (Roche). Antigen detection 
  
was carried out by two different methods: a rapid antigen detection test (Binax Now Influenza A & B, 
Binax Inc.) and a cell culture immunofluorescence test (IFT, MDCK cells, Influenza A ? B DFA Kit, 
Millipore). Patient samples were additionally tested for other respiratory viruses (parainfluenza virus 
types 1–3, respiratory syncytial virus, adenovirus, enteroviruses) by PCR, antigen assay or virus 
isolation in tissue cultures. Coinfections with bacterial or fungal pathogens were excluded for all 
samples. In addition to the specific diagnostics for respiratory disease, patients were generally 
monitored for infections with microbial and viral pathogens and for reactivation of herpes viruses 
(herpes simplex virus type 1 and 2, cytomegalovirus, varicella-zoster virus, Epstein–Barr virus) using 
routine diagnostic methods. For the investigation of the health care workers (HCWs), pharyngeal 
lavages were tested by the same methods, skipping only the cell-culturebased IFT.  
 
 
Typing and subtyping of influenza viruses  
 
If they tested positive in either of the assays, specimen were considered positive for influenza virus 
and were sent to the National Reference Centre for Influenza Virus (Robert-Koch-Institute, Berlin) for 
further investigation. Typing and subtyping of influenza A viruses was carried out by real-time RT-PCR 
(TaqMan 7900) as described previously [14] with some modifications (primer and probe sequences 
available on request). For virus isolation, 200 ll of virus suspension were inoculated onto confluent 
Madin– Darby canine kidney (MDCK) cells. The cells were maintained in rolling tubes containing 
serum-free minimum essential medium (Gibco BRL, Life Technologies GmbH, Karlsruhe, Germany) 
supplemented with 1.25 lg of trypsin per ml (Gibco BRL). The cultures were incubated at 33°C. 
Cultures were tested continuously for hemagglutination of guinea pig red blood cells (0.5% vol/vol). 
Hemagglutination-positive cultures were identified using the classical hemagglutination inhibition (HI) 
procedure. Briefly, specific antisera raised in ferrets were treated with receptor-destroying enzyme. HI 






PCR products were purified from agarose gels using the JETquick spin column technique (Genomed, 
Löhne, Germany) according to manufacturer’s instructions. Purified PCR products were cycle 
sequenced in the forward and the reverse directions (primer sequences available on request) in a 






A multiple sequence alignment was compiled from amplified HA sequences using ClustalW in the 
Bioedit version 7.0.9. Phylogenetic analysis was performed using the PHYLIP version 3.64 package. 
Sequence distances were calculated, and clustering was done by the neighborjoining algorithm of the 
PHYLIP program package. The reference strains A/New Caledonia/20/99, A/SolomonIslands/3/2006 
and A/Brisbane/59/2007 as well as influenza A/H1N1 viruses circulating in Germany during the 
2007/2008 season were included in the phylogenetic analysis. Evaluation of the robustness of the tree 
was performed by bootstrap analysis carried out with 500 replicates. The tree was plotted using 
TREEVIEW and was manually edited using the Corel Draw 12 program. 
 
 
Detection of antibodies 
 
For the investigation of influenza A and B IgA antibodies, a commercially available 
immunofluorescence assay was used (Fluorimmun-Influenza indirect IFT Kit, Dr. Merck & Coll., 
Germany). For the time points at which specimen were collected, see ‘‘Results’’. 
 
 
Introduction of control measures 
 
On February 21, 2008, three different patients in the same hospital ward tested positive for influenza 
virus, indicating the occurrence of an influenza outbreak (Fig. 1). The hospital unit introduced control 
measures, which were readily implemented on February 22, 2008. Patients testing positive for 
  
influenza virus were cohorted separately from other patients. Individuals presenting symptoms of 
respiratory disease were placed in private rooms and tested carefully for respiratory viruses. Transfer 
of patients between units and entrance of visitors was restricted to the absolutely necessary and under 
conditions of respiratory isolation. Enhanced hand washing and environmental sanitation were carried 
out. Infected patients were administered either oseltamivir or zanamivir or a combination of both, 
theywere cared for by vaccinated staff members, and unvaccinated HCWs were offered immediate 
vaccination. HCWs suffering from respiratory disease were offered treatment with antiviral drugs, and 





Description of the outbreak 
 
Figure 1 illustrates the detection of influenza virus in five patients. Specimens of patients one, three 
and four were repeatedly influenza-virus-positive, either by RT-PCR or antigen testing. Patients two, 
three, four and five died shortly after the last detection of virus, accounting for a case fatality rate of 
80%. The median age of the patients was 44.2 years, and all of the patients had an established 
haematologic disease, having received at least one round of bone marrow transplantation. Patient one 
recovered from the acute virus infection and displayed prolonged virus shedding, as has been 
described by others [8, 11]. Excluding this patient, the duration of the outbreak was 22 days 
(calculated from the first to the last detection of virus in the patients). No new cases emerged after day 
ten, indicating that the introduction of control measures was effective. 
 
 
Characterization of the virus isolates 
 
All isolates from the patients were identified to belong to the H1N1 subtype of influenza A by subtype-
specific RT-PCR. Sequence analysis of the HA1 region revealed identical nucleotide sequences in the 
isolates of patients two, four and five, whereas one nucleotide difference was found in the strain from 
patient one, resulting in an amino acid substitution (G153R, 99% homology). Unfortunately, the isolate 
from patient three could not be sequenced because of a lack of sample material. These findings 
indicate that one specific strain of influenza virus was most probably introduced into the hospital ward 
and spread from one patient to others. A phylogenetic analysis of the HA1 gene (1,000 nucleotides) of 
the patients’ viruses revealed a close relationship to the HA genes of influenza A/H1N1 viruses 
circulating in Germany during the influenza season 2007/08 and the new reference strain 
A/Brisbane/59/2007, which was recommended as the H1N1 vaccine strain for 2008/2009 (Fig. 2). The 
viruses isolated from the patients formed a separate cluster including an influenza virus detected in the 
German state of Baden-Wuerttemberg during 2007/2008.  
 
The antigenic profile of the virus isolates was analyzed using a set of ferret antisera to current vaccine 
and reference strains. All of the virus strains reacted well with antiserum to A/Solomon Islands/3/006, 
the A/H1N1 vaccine strain of the season 2007/2008. However, all isolates were antigenically more 
closely related to the new reference 
strain A/Brisbane/59/2009, which was also the case with the majority of A/H1N1 viruses circulating in 
Germany during 2007/2008.  
 
 
Testing of health care workers  
 
To investigate the source of infection, the medical staff (n = 104) of the hospital unit was tested and 
found negative for influenza RNA and antigen in pharyngeal lavages. The HCWs were additionally 
tested for IgA antibodies against influenza A and B virus at two different time points. The first serum 
panel was collected together with the pharyngeal lavages, and the second panel was collected 4 
weeks later (March 25 to April 15, 2008). Overall, 12 staff members tested positive for influenza A IgA 
antibodies, and 13 were positive for influenza B IgA antibodies (Table 1). Of the 104 individuals 
included in the first panel, 60 were tested again. Of the five individuals who were positive for influenza 
A IgA antibodies in the first serum panel, four were again positive in the second sample, one person 
did not receive a second venipuncture and seven staff members who had been IgA negative 
seroconverted between the first and second tests. With influenza B, among the seven staff members 
who were positive for IgA antibodies in the second panel, five had already tested positive in the first 
sample, accounting for two influenza B IgA seroconversions. Of these 11 individuals, six were not 
  
available at the second time point. The detection of IgA antibodies suggest that wild-type influenza 
virus infections had occurred within the medical staff at the same time the patients were infected and 





In the present influenza outbreak, the homology of the HA1 sequences found in the affected patients 
suggests that most probably only one specific strain of influenza virus was introduced into the hospital 
ward and spread from patient to patient. A circulation of this virus in the hospital unit is more likely than 
the introduction of identical isolates through different individuals. This hypothesis is confirmed by the 
fact that patients one and two were placed in the same room prior to the beginning of respiratory 
disease. The detection of IgA antibodies against influenza A and B in the HCWs suggests that wild-
type infections might have occurred among the medical staff at the same time the patients were 
infected.  
 
The first venipucture of the HCWs was carried out at a time point when the circulation of the virus was 
detected in the patients by RT-PCR. It has been shown that HCWs can be infected with influenza virus 
either in their workplace or in the community, and that a portion of them continued to work while ill [16]. 
In the present case, there were also members of the medical staff who were suffering from respiratory 
illness at the same time of the disease outbreak. Interestingly, the ratio between positive IgA 
antibodies against influenza A virus (n = 12) and influenza B virus (n = 13) in both serum panels was 
48–52%, reflecting the ratio of circulating influenza subtypes in Germany in the 
winter season 2007/08 (48% influenza A: 98% A/H1N1, 2% H3N2; 52% influenza B) [3]. Because all 
respiratory samples of the HCWs were found negative for influenza RNA and antigen, we were unable 
to confirm the medical staff to be the original source of infection. There might be different reasons for 
this. It is known that, even in acute influenza disease, the virus becomes undetectable in the 
respiratory tract within days after infection [7]. The pharyngeal lavages of the HCWs were collected 
from February 27 to March 5, 2008, i.e. not less than 9 days after the first detection of virus in the 
patients. Therefore, PCR and antigen testing could have missed the virus, since it might already have 
been cleared from the respiratory tract. Another trivial reason might be that the individual who 
transmitted the virus was among the staff members who were absent from work because of illness. 
These individuals were excluded from the investigation. Even if there are strong hints of an 
introduction of the influenza virus through the medical staff, the virus might also have been transmitted 
to patients by visitors. Another possibility is that the infection of the first patient was 
communityacquired. This might have happened especially with patient five, who was already receiving 
mechanical ventilation when he entered the hospital ward. Intubation and other droplet-generating 
procedures have been shown to increase the risk of transmitting infectious agents to HCWs [5], who 
might thereafter induce and sustain the circulation of virus between patients.  
 
Phylogenetic analysis revealed that the analysed HA genes of the viruses isolated during the present 
outbreak were closely related to the HA genes of A/H1N1 viruses circulating in Germany during the 
influenza season 2007/2008 as well as to the new reference strain A/Brisbane/59/2007. Even if the 
2007/2008 A/H1N1 vaccine strain A/Solomon Islands/3/2006 and the newly recommended vaccine 
strain A/Brisbane/59/2007 are genetically different, both strains are antigenically more similar. Our 
findings suggest that vaccination with A/Solomon Islands/3/ 2006 would presumably have had a 
protective effect. It is known that the trivalent inactivated vaccine (TIV) against seasonal influenza has 
a 70–90% efficacy in healthy adults under 65 years of age [10]. In bone marrow transplant recipients, 
the response to vaccination is usually lost for at least 6 months after transplantation and gradually 
returns so that responses are generally intact 2 years after transplantation [6].  
 
The duration of influenza outbreaks varies strongly, ranging between a few days [9] and several 
months [10, 12, 13], and depends on multiple factors, such as the clientele of patients, the local setting 
in the hospital, the vaccination rates of HCWs and patients and the introduction of control measures. 
In this case, the duration of the outbreak was 10 days, suggesting that the introduction of control 
measures was effective. On the other hand, influenza virus causes an infection with a short incubation 
period, leading 
to an acute respiratory illness and a comparatively short period of virus shedding, at least in non-
immunocompromised adults. Therefore, it is not possible to distinguish between the effect of control 
measures and a self-limitation of the outbreak [8].  
 
  
In the case of the hospital unit described here, the vaccination coverage of the medical staff and of the 
patients is not precisely known. However, one can estimate that it was at least not higher than it is 
worldwide, i.e. less than 40% [1, 15]. This was confirmed by the Department of Occupational Health, 
which carried out the influenza vaccinations in this hospital. On the basis of our case definition, which 
only includes individuals for whom influenza virus was detected directly, the extent of the outbreak 
might have been underestimated. It must also be taken into account that the patients might also have 
died due to their underlying leukaemic disease and associated complications. In any case, the findings 
from this influenza outbreak demonstrate the need to have the highest achievable vaccination 
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Tables and Figures 
 
Figure 1 Detection of influenza virus in the five patients involved in the outbreak (positive signs within 
gray bars). Patients one, three and four were repeatedly found to be influenza virus-positive, either by 
PCR or antigen testing. All of the patients had an established haematologic disease. All patients but 
one died shortly after the last detection of virus in respiratory specimens. Patient one recovered from 
the acute virus infection and displayed prolonged virus shedding. Negative signs indicate negative 






































Figure 2 Phylogenetic analysis of the HA1 region of the HA gene of A/H1N1 viruses. This analysis 
includes A/H1N1 viruses isolated from patients during the outbreak, A/H1N1 viruses circulating in 
Germany during 2006/2007 (clade 1, clade 2A, group 1 of clade 2B) and during 2007/2008 (group 2 of 
clade 2B) as well as three reference strains. The strain A/New Caledonia/20/99 was recommended as 
a vaccine strain until 2006/2007, the strain A/Solomon Islands/3/2006 for the 2007/2008 season, and 
the strain A/Brisbane/59/2007 was the new A/H1N1 component in the season 2008/2009. 
Phylogenetic clustering was done by the neighbor-joining algorithm based on a bootstrap analysis with 











Table 1 Serological results of the medical staff of the hospital ward where the influenza outbreak 
occurred 
 
 
  
